Abstract By combining features from distinct theoretical approaches, namely the evolutionary and the job search, matching and bargaining literatures, we propose a model that captures the main dynamics of a world where heterogeneous firms and workers interact and co-evolve. Within a micro-meso framework, the model focuses on the influence of firms' labour choices ("institutional settings") on industry dynamics, taking into account the existence of employment adjustment costs. The consideration of endogenous matching and bargaining processes in the labour market results in significant frictions, such as the simultaneous coexistence of unfilled job vacancies and unemployment. In a setting where technological progress is not biased a stylized fact of industrialized world economies in the last few decades emerges, the increasing wage inequality. Additionally, turbulence in the industry increases after a negative demand shock. As expected, the negative demand shock causes a decrease in the number of vacancies and, consequently, unemployment rates increase considerably. Interestingly, and mimicking the recent experiences of countries such as US, Spain, Greece and Portugal, the rise in unemployment is matched by a rise in contractual wages. This outcome is explained by the lower ability of the firms to fill their posted vacancies, which results from friction in the interactions among agents.
Evolutionary economics offers a much more realistic setting as it conceives the observed co-evolution between aggregate variables, such as employment and output, as resulting from far-from-equilibrium interactions between heterogeneous agents. Therefore, even when some equilibrium relationship take place among aggregate variables, for example, inflows and outflows from unemployment, the economy might systematically depart from it and follow a disequilibrium trajectory (Fagiolo et al. 2004 ). Moreover, a methodological approach that does not forcibly require equilibrium, assuming rather that it may emerge from interactions among all the players in the model, allows for a broader analysis of labour markets (Richiardi 2006) .
In an evolutionary world, workers and firms interact directly, and their behaviours are influenced by the choices made in the past by both themselves and other agents. Such interaction networks, materialized in matching rules in the labour market, are endogenous and may change over time (Fagiolo et al. 2004 ). Interaction occurs both in the labour and product markets, and the firms' survival depends on their labour choices, such as hiring and firing policies and wage-setting decisions. In fact, changes in the industry structure and worker mobility influence each other. For example, Dunne et al. (1989) show that industry dynamics are associated with the creation and elimination of jobs. Moreover, Haveman (1995) stresses that industry turbulence influences the labour market not only directly, through the movement of individuals employed in established firms to new ones, and of individuals allocated to exiting organizations to surviving ones, but also indirectly, through the vacancy chains associated with the founding and exiting processes of firms.
However, evolutionary economics does not usually focus on these topics, with most models of evolutionary industrial dynamics emphasizing the technological and/or financial determinants of the evolution of industries (see e.g., Dosi et al. 1997; Sutton 1997) . Therefore, mainstream contributions, particularly with regard to job search, matching and bargaining processes (e.g., Mortensen 1970 Mortensen , 1982 Mortensen , 1986 Mortensen , 1999 Pissarides 1994, 1999) , are important to comply with our main motivation: bring labour market dynamics into the evolutionist framework. In this framework, the economy is a complex and evolving system, agents are bounded rational and heterogeneous in almost all their attributes, there are open-ended search spaces and novelty is endogenous (for example, Winter 1982, 2002; Dosi 1988; Andersen 1994; Nelson 1995) .
In this paper, we explicitly introduce labour market dynamics in a model that explores the implications of firms' behaviour in their industry. The matching process that emerges from interactions between firms and workers in the labour market is crucial to understanding wage inequality, (un)employment and output growth dynamics. These topics are extensively explored in the neoclassical approach, whereas few formal contributions exist within evolutionary literature. One important exception is Fagiolo et al. (2004) , who offer a model close to both the "Agent-Based Computational Economics" (ACE) approach (Tesfatsion 1997; Epstein and Axtell 1996) and self-organization models of labour markets (Lesourne 1992) .
Despite such valuable and insightful contributions, the industrial level remains somehow overlooked and disconnected from real world evidence. In fact, both neoclassical (e.g., Geroski 1995; Cabral and Mata 2003) and neo-schumpeterian (e.g., Pavitt 1984; Malerba and Orsenigo 1995) empirical strands reinforce the importance of industrial dynamics and turbulence. It is interesting to note that in several world economies (e.g., US, Spain, Greece and Portugal) the recent economic downturn (as reflected by the GDP growth rate) has been associated with rising wages (and wage inequality) and increasing unemployment (Fig. 1) .
The model proposed in this paper adopts a setting similar to that put forward by Fagiolo et al. (2004) , in terms of the job search, matching and bargaining mechanisms. However, our model besides including two distinct types of labour, routine and non-routine workers (Egger and Grossmann 2005) , whereas Fagiolo et al. (2004) only consider homogeneous labour, also takes into account the industrial dynamics and turbulence. Furthermore, we focus on the idea of firms as heterogeneous organizations, with distinct "institutional settings", 2 which evolve over time building the firms' own "institutional setting", and on how such choices interact with the evolving industrial process. In such a framework, our modelling exercise endeavours to capture the important dynamics of an evolutionary world where heterogeneous individuals, firms and workers interact and co-evolve. 3 In our model coevolution intends to capture the original idea that evolutionary changes in one economic variable, dimensions or agents are a response to changes in other interacting variables, dimensions or agents. For example, the changes in labour market variables such as wages depend on the changes in firm's technological specifications. This model selects labour organizational choices as the substantial nature of firms' "institutional settings", and is based on the specificity of labour amongst the firms' inputs, since it carries imprinted relations and constitutes the core of the firms' routines (Stinchcombe 1965) . We assume that workers have distinct attributes. Certain workers (the nonroutine) are more able to learn, organize people and tasks, make decisions and adapt to changing environments. These qualities may be associated with the worker's level of general education, which develops her/his analytical skills and abstract reasoning capabilities, and stimulates the ability to learn. However, they may also be associated with unobservable features such as attitude, confidence, ability to organize and adaptability.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details the formal evolutionary model. In Sect. 3, the simulation exercise is presented and the results are discussed. Finally, Sect. 4 presents some concluding remarks.
Model set-up
In our model, the players are firms and workers within a certain industry, held together by two markets: an output market and a labour market. Firms differ with respect to the choices they make concerning their "institutional settings", which is approximated by the composition of their labour force. These choices have implications in the number of vacancies they post and the wages they offer, and are made according to the firms' profitability and market shares. Workers differ with respect to their abilities/tasks they are able to perform (Autor et al. 2003; Egger and Grossmann 2005) , being categorized as routine and non-routine. They decide to search for a job, having a certain wage level in mind. Firms and workers interact then on the basis of matching and bargaining rules in the labour market, and the contractual wages result from these interactions. Figure 2 presents the structural scheme of the model. In the next sections, all the details of the model are explained. 3 The concept coevolution was initially proposed in the Ecology field, meaning that evolutionary changes in one species are a response to changes in other interacting species The concept has been used to represent different types of interaction such as biological and cultural; ecological and economic; production and consumption; technology and preferences, and so on (Van den Bergh and Stagl 2003) . According to Van den Bergh and Stagl (2003); Norgaard (1984) was the first to use this concept explicitly in a socio-economic context. The human invention of agriculture and all cultural and economic developments that were emergent compose an example of coevolution in real economy (Campbell, 1996 cited by Van den Bergh and Stagl 2003) . 
Firms and workers
We consider that each firm in a certain industry is associated to one specific "institutional setting" that can be more or less close to the industry's institutional frame. 4 The survival likelihood for each firm i depends on its ability to hire the suitable workers for its "institutional setting" and on its ability to react to environmental change (which are connected with the transparency of the institutional environment). The "fitness" of each firm must be defined as a function of these abilities. 5 In our framework, firms cannot fully understand the complexity of the economic system. Information is incomplete, in particular with regard to future economic development (imperfect foresight). This study is based on the concept of bounded rationality (Simon 1955 (Simon , 1956 March and Simon 1958 ), which appears in opposition to the traditional neoclassical assumption of fully rational agents. The bounded rationality program incorporates all the constraints on human knowledge and human computation, which are responsible for the distinct behaviours of real actors when compared with the predictions made by neoclassical economic theory. 6 Furthermore, Simon (1956) introduces the idea that decision-making is influenced not only by information processing capabilities, but also by the environment. Following Simon's contributions on human rationality and decision-making, we assume that firms make decisions based on adaptive expectations, with decisions being revised periodically, since their strategies are likely to be inconsistent.
As mentioned above, in our model, the actors of the economic system are workers and firms within a certain industry. A single good is produced and there is no difference between the outputs of the firms in terms of quality. The good is sold and bought in the output market that takes place at the end of each period. Firms supply their maximum output, and the output price is determined so it clears the market.
In the labour market, there are L workers of two distinct types. First, "routine workers", j R ∈ 1, . . . , L R , who are the agents without the ability to handle activities involving innovative procedures, since they lack the minimum attributes required to deal with unexpected change. Their learning capability is of a learning-by-doing type. We will assume that these workers have attributes that make them "fit" into activities featured by routine or standard procedures. Second, we have "non-routine workers",
These agents have attributes that make them "fit" into activities where the reaction to unexpected change and learning-bythinking are crucial. Therefore, non-routine workers have a greater ability to perform activities involving problem-solving and complex tasks, and are thus well suited to organizational forms that demand team work and job rotation. 7 Our categorization of workers is different from that usually proposed in the literature as unskilled and skilled workers. Routine workers are individuals with severe difficulties in adapting to new situations, whereas the non-routine ones are highly flexible. 8 Typically, the division of job levels appears as low-and high-skilled 6 Simon sustains that decision-makers must simplify the decision actions, suggesting the "satisficing" concept as one possibility (Simon 1955) . A decision-maker will maintain a search until a good enough solution is found: "The player instead of seeking for a "best" move, needs only to look for a "good" move" (Simon 1955: 108) . 7 A large amount of psychology literature documents and characterizes the heterogeneity present in the way people react to change in their environment (see, for example, Harrigton 1998). In general, a person reacts to her/his environment following some regular behaviour across several circumstances. This pattern of behaviour reflects in part what the person is. She/he may usually change her/his strategies, being flexible in the sense that her/his behaviour is driven by the conditions of the environment. In contrast, a person may be rigid, showing a behaviour that is always close to some fundamental approach, being relatively unresponsive to the current environment. For example, some businessmen adjust their business strategy to new market conditions while others maintain a commitment with the original plans (Rosenthal 1993; Harrigton 1998 ). 8 Flexibility has been a major topic within the operations management and strategy literatures. In broad terms, we can understand flexibility as an absorber of environmental uncertainty and variability. Its value lies in offering protection against an unpredictable future, through resources that are fundamentally adaptable as well as constructing a set of routines that allow for a quick reorganization in response to unstable markets (Gerwin 1993; De Toni and Tonchia 1998; Beach et al. 2000) . Whilst sheltering from external disorders may be crucial for survival, the organism must have internal mechanisms to ensure a degree of reliability and coherence when facing environmental change. In reality, total flexibility makes it impossible for the organization to keep a sense of identity and continuity (Weick 1982; Adler 1988; Loasby 1999) . Therefore, organizations must deal with a trade-off concerning flexibility and stability, in order to survive but, at the same time, avoid disruption to the continuity of organizational processes. (Finegold and Soskice 1988) . High-skill jobs require professional or scientific skills at the level of high vocational or university education. Low-skill jobs are associated with simple, routine tasks which mainly demand the use of hand-held tools and physical effort. In our division, the routine worker can have a higher degree of formal education and even so be unable to react to change. She/he can perform tasks that demand school training at a higher level but do not require flexibility in responses, and are featured by monotony, repetitiveness and work constraints. Our routine versus non routine categorization goes in line with Autor et al. (2003) and their routinization hypothesis by recognizing that workers capabilities and tasks' features may diverge. Certainly, there is a high correlation between the capability to deal with change and new situations and the degree of professional and scientific skills. In the skilled versus unskilled categorization, it is possible that high-skilled workers are more efficient than low-skilled ones in low-level jobs. In our typology, we assume this is not the case. A non-routine worker is less efficient than a routine one if matched with a routinized set of tasks. This occurs because her/his attributes require spending time looking for innovative procedures, which is a non-profitable behaviour within a routinized and inert activity. The level at which firms and production processes call for these types of workers is expected to vary across industries and occupations.
Baseline configuration
We consider an industry (Ind) composed by a certain number of firms N t in each discrete time period t, with t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Firms produce the same homogeneous good, with one production factor, labour, comprised of two distinct types of workers. In each period, a firm i produces X it units of the homogeneous good whose price is p t > 0.
The industry is characterized at each time t by an exogenous institutional environment represented by the variable I I nd t . 9 Each firm i in the industry, at time t, is featured by a specific "institutional setting" represented by the variable I it . The "institutional fitness" of the firm at time t is measured by |I it − I I nd t |. The firm decides on the following set of variables in each time period
where:
• L R it and L N R it correspond to the number of workers associated with routine and non-routine activities, respectively, employed by the firm in each time period;
• w R it and w N R it correspond to the contractual wages that firms offer, in each time period, to routine and non-routine workers, respectively, as the result of an endogenous matching and bargaining process (described in detail in Sect. 2.1.3);
• v R it and v N R it corresponds to the number of job openings defined by each firm at t for routine and non-routine workers, respectively. The firm's output level X it is a function of technological progress A it , and of the number of workers L R it and L N R it :
where A it corresponds to the total factor productivity of the technique employed by the firms in each period t.
We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale associated with routine and non-routine labour:
where β 1 + β 2 = 1, β 1 > 0 and β 2 > 0. Dividing X it by the total number of workers of firm i at time t, L it , we obtain the firm's product efficiency per unit of labour, x it :
where l it represents the stock of routine workers per unit of total labour and α it corresponds to the ratio
(that is, the relative importance of non-routine workers). We consider a simple framework in which the "institutional setting" of each firm is represented by α it and by an ex-ante unobservable variable ψ it that sums up factors that determine this setting, but which are not controlled by the firm. More precisely, in each time period t, the I it variable results from the existent "institutional setting" given by α it−1 , from the investment made at time t by the firm to improve its own "fitness" in the institutional environment (the rearrangement of the proportion of workers through matching and bargaining processes, hiring and firing decisions), represented by α it , and from an unobservable random variable, ψ it . Formally, we have:
The firm may choose more rigid or more flexible "institutional settings". In the first case, the firm has preference for more routine workers. In the second, the non-routine workers are crucial. The variable α it represents the firm's institutional options, which are made by boundedly rational agents in a context of uncertainty. Each firm faces a trade-off when choosing the "satisficing" share of workers: a very low α it means low wage costs but low possibilities to adjust, whereas a very high α it corresponds to high possibilities to adapt, but also to high wage costs that may not be compensated by the adjustment benefit. The short-run profit function, π it , of each firm i at time t is:
where c it is the cost function. The costs of the firm depend on the workers' wages (w R and w N R ) and on the "mix" of workers (α it ). They also depend on a "transaction cost", associated with the workers' competencies, which is defined as τ it = (|I it − I I nd t |). If the firm has a proportion of labour competencies close to the one that features its environment, this means a lower "transaction cost". Otherwise, this cost rises since the firm will have, for example, to subcontract thinking workers able to react to unexpected situations or deal with innovative procedures in industries featured by flexible "institutional settings". On the other hand, a firm within an industry characterized by a rigid "institutional setting" also faces high transaction costs if it has a very flexible "institutional setting". In fact, this firm has more costs, not only in the form of wages, since w N R > w R , but also costs deriving from the constant search for new possibilities in a very inert environment. 10 Formally, the cost function, c it , is defined as: 11
Firms employ labour in one-period contracts, so wages are paid after one period of employment. As mentioned previously, the model considers distinct remunerations for each type of worker. For routine workers, the wage is w R , and for non-routine workers, it is w N R , with w N R > w R . Therefore, on the one hand, we have workers that earn less, representing lower costs to firms, but that are incapable of adjusting. Therefore, firms with a high proportion of these workers are much more likely to perish when facing an unexpected and significant environmental change than those with a higher proportion of non-routine workers. On the other hand, non-routine workers receive a higher wage, meaning a higher cost for the firm, but are flexible and able to quickly adjust to changes. They are crucial for the firm to react to such changes, avoiding bankruptcy or even enabling the firm's growth. Wages emerge from the interaction between firms and workers. They correspond to contractual wages offered by firms to workers, as a result of matching and bargaining processes. Wage rates can be different for each worker, and we assume that each worker supplies only one unit of labour.
10 These transaction costs may also be interpreted as a time delay associated with 'some time to build' that firms must spend with their workers before they become productive. The higher the 'institutional fitness' of the worker, the lower this time delay. 11 In the simulation exercise costs are defined as an equation 'cost' which, if the firm has no workers and does not produce assumes a cost equal to zero; otherwise, it is an additive function of wage costs (number of non-routine workers times their wage plus the number of routine workers times their wage) and a fitness cost that depends on the comparison between the 'institutional setting' of the firm and the industrial environment (I I nd t ). The higher this distance, the higher will be this cost. This transaction cost also includes an idiosyncratic noise for taking into account the uncertainty in the ability of the firm to adjust to its institutional setting.
Similarly to Fagiolo et al. (2004) , we adopt the following assumptions concerning wages and jobs:
• Each firm i has a satisficing wage it wants to offer at time t to any routine (nonroutine) worker,
, which she/he wants to obtain from the firm at time t; • Any worker j will only accept contractual wages if they are equal or greater to her/his reservation wage (denoted as w R R jt and w R N R jt for routine and non-routine workers, respectively); 12 • Jobs last only one period and therefore workers must search for a new job in each period; • Job openings for firm i at time t, v it , correspond to labour demand and, at the same time, to ex-ante vacancies or new job positions; • The ex-post vacancies correspond to the number of unfilled job openings;
• Workers can be unemployed;
• Firms may not assure their labour demand.
Job openings, job search, job matching and bargaining procedures
Job openings Each firm i creates, at the beginning of period t, a queue of job openings for each type of worker. 13 In each time period, each firm decides on how many job vacancies to open for routine workers v R it and non-routine workers v N R it . In terms of the firms' decisions about how many vacancies to open in each time period, we consider a behavioural scenario featured by some path-dependency. 14 We define the process in formal terms similarly to Fagiolo et al. (2004) .
The total number of job openings (for both types of workers) in period t by firm i depends on the value of vacancies in t − 1 (path-dependency), and on the evolution of the firm's profit. If profits in t are higher or equal to profits in the previous period the firm increases the number of total vacancies. Otherwise, it decreases it:
where F is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variable, with a normal distribution marked by a zero mean and a σ 2 v > 0 variance. The variance σ 2 v offers a measure of the way firms react to the profits growth rate, enlarging or shrinking their current queue size. A higher variance means a higher sensitivity to market signals.
While in Fagiolo et al. (2004) labour is homogeneous, in our model labour is heterogeneous, and so the process of job openings is associated with changes in each firm's relative importance of non-routine workers, i.e.,
. The total number of job openings will then be split into two queues, one for each type of worker, according to the value of α it :
We assume that firms always open at least one job vacancy for each type of worker in each time period.
Job search In Fagiolo et al. (2004) two job search procedures are taken into account. The first scenario assumes no search inertia. This means that each worker j randomly visits one firm i in the market. If the chosen firm still has available places in the queue, the worker gets in and asks for her/his satisficing wage w s jt . In the second scenario, the authors introduce some stickiness, conceived as loyalty, in firm visiting. If a certain worker j was employed in firm i in period t − 1, she/he starts by visiting firm i. If this firm still has available places in the queue, the worker gets in and asks for w s jt−1 . If not, the worker uses the random value defined in the no search scenario to select from among the remaining N t−1 firms. In both scenarios, a worker can only enter one queue, and stays unemployed if she/he chooses a firm that has already filled all the available slots in its queue.
In our model, a similar approach is used but always with search inertia, since we recognize the existence of important transaction costs associated with the process of job search, not only for firms, but also for workers (although they are not explicitly defined in our model), which are certainly more significant than just loyalty considerations. Beyond contractual reasons, firms prefer workers who are already familiar with their structures, technologies and methods. A similar preference is experienced by workers. These preferences reveal the need to reduce transaction costs and uncertainty (e.g., Nickell 1986; Teixeira 2004) .
Moreover, we consider two types of workers. Each of these workers searches for a job opening for their particular type. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that workers may not apply to job openings that do not correspond to their particular type. For example, a non-routine worker cannot search for a routine job opening, and a routine worker cannot search for a non-routine vacancy.
Job matching and bargaining After workers queue up, the process of job matching and bargaining takes place. As in Fagiolo et al. (2004) , we assume that firms start exploring the workers' wage demands to match them with their offers. At each time period t, firm i observes the workers in its two queues. Let 0
denote the number of workers in the non-routine and routine queues, respectively. The firm then computes the average wage w it demanded by workers in both queues. Formally:
and
The firm then sets the contractual wages for period t as a linear combination of the average wages, w N R it and w R it , and the satisficing wages, w s N R it−1 and w s R it−1 . Thus:
where β, γ ∈ [0, 1] and β < γ . In line with Fagiolo et al. (2004) , we define the institutional parameters β and γ to govern the firm's strength in wage bargaining. The power of the firms in the wage setting process increases with the value of β and γ . Assuming β < γ means that firms have more power in the setting of the wages for the routine workers than for the non-routine ones. 15 Following this procedure, each firm sets the contractual wage that it is willing to offer to workers in the queues. However, any given worker will only accept the job position if the contractual wage is equal or larger than her/his reservation wage.
After this matching and bargaining process, updating of the satisficing wage values, for both firms and workers, takes place, within a bounded rationality frame. We consider that when a routine (non-routine) worker j accepts a job position, she/he changes the satisficing wage to the new earned wage, i.e.,
. In addition, each firm i which has filled at least one job vacancy in each queue will also replace its satisficing wages, w s R it−1 = w R it and w s N R it−1 = w N R it . Fagiolo et al. (2004) additionally consider the possibility that surviving firms and workers may wish to revise their satisficing wages according to their perceptions about the result of the economy's dynamic. In this vein, we assume that each firm has a fixed desired ratio of filled to opened job positions for each type of work:
The above ratios are then compared to the current effective ratios:
Indeed, if the firm has not hired enough workers, as compared with the number of job positions it had decided to open, it will be willing to increase the wages offered to workers. Otherwise, it may want to decrease them. A simple rule is adopted to give a formal meaning to this behaviour. For routine workers, we have:
where Y is an i.i.d. random variable with a standard normal distribution and w s R it−1 = w R it if the firm has hired at least one routine worker. Similarly, for non-routine workers:
where w s N R it−1 = w N R it if the firm has hired at least one non-routine worker. Given the number of both types of workers hired by each firm, the model then computes each firm's production, the price and profits. Each firm's ex-post vacancies, v R it andṽ N R it , are defined as:ṽ
andṽ
In what concerns the updating of the workers' satisficing wages, we assume that any worker who remains unemployed after the matching and bargaining process might want to reduce her/his satisficing wage, without violating the threshold imposed by the reservation wage. Otherwise, she/he may want to ask for a higher wage in the next bargaining round. In formal terms, we have:
where Y is an i.i.d. random variable with a standard normal distribution, w s R it−1 = w R it and w s N R it−1 = w N R it if j R and j N R have just been hired.
Technological progress
In terms of labour productivity dynamics, two technological scenarios are analyzed. The first considers an equal technological level for all firms, that is A it = A t ∀i, where A t = A t−1 e g and g is the exogenous rate of technological progress. The second scenario assumes the presence of firm-specific technological progress. We consider that the industry has an exogenous technological trajectory A ht , defined as A ht = A ht−1 e g , which corresponds to the maximum value that the firms within the industry can achieve. We associate with each firm a measure of technological efficiency, μ it , 0 < μ it ≤ 1, such that the technological progress for each is represented as:
Each firm's efficiency measure increases with the firm's fitness and with the relative importance of each firm's innovative non-routine workers. 17
Industry level
The aggregate output of the industry is computed at each time period as the sum of the output of all the firms in the industry at that time:
17 In our simulation exercise we first consider that technological progress (A) for a firm is equal to the industry's technological progress (A h ). Then, the A value is double reduced comparing to the possible maximum (A h ): (1) according to the firm fitness-the highest this fitness, the smallest the A reduction; (2) according to the comparison between the number of non routine workers of the firm and a chosen threshold value-if the firm hires more non routine workers than this threshold, it will be in disadvantage.
We assume that the short-term equilibrium price results from the confrontation of the total supply with a constant price-elasticity demand function:
where η is the demand price elasticity and D t > 0 is the exogenous demand. The number of firms operating in the industry in each time period t, N t , is constant, since we assume that the firms that leave the market are automatically replaced by an equal number of firms with characteristics close to the average of the attributes of the surviving firms in that period.
Labour market
As mentioned earlier, workers may be unemployed. In aggregate terms, the number of unemployed workers of each type is equal to:
The aggregate values of routine vacancies and non-routine vacancies are:
3 Simulation exercise
Details on the computational model, simulation trials and robustness
The computational model was built in Lsd (the "Laboratory for Simulation Development"), a free-use language for simulation models written by Marco Valente (see, for example, Valente 1998; Valente and Andersen 2002 ).
The simulation model executes the following steps: 1. Given the initial position of the institutional set of firms and the institutional environment in the industry at t = 0, we solve for the output and profits of firms, and the market price. 2. Firms decide to maintain or to change their institutional setting in the next period, according to the evolution of their profits and their market shares. This decision is materialized in the mix of their workers. If the profits in t + 1 are higher than in t and the market share in t + 1 is higher than in t, firms do not change their mix of workers. They only do so, if this is not the case. 3. After the decision to maintain or change the mix of workers, job search, matching and bargaining takes place: (a) The firms decide how many vacancies for each type of worker they want to open in period t + 1. Each firm opens at least one posting of each type. (b) Routine (non-routine) workers search for a firm posting at least one job opening of the routine (non-routine) type and queue up. (c) The process of job matching and bargaining takes place: firms look in their queues and start bargaining with workers who have queued up (if any) for both types of jobs to decide whether to hire or not. 4. After hiring, production takes place. Aggregate demand is exogenous and the aggregate supply is obtained by simply aggregating the individual supplies. 5. After a certain number of runs, firms undergo a selection process. We established that firms that accumulate negative or nil profits during the last five time steps leave the market. Each exiting firm is replaced by a new firm with initial features close to the average characteristics of the surviving firms at that time period. This procedure allows us to keep an invariant number of firms in the economy at each t. 6. Firms and workers update their satisficing wages. 7. Technological progress takes place. As mentioned previously, we consider equal technological progress and firm-specific technological progress scenarios. The simulation requires us to set initial values for several variables and for all the parameters. Our calibration work was guided by some available empirical literature on labour markets and on internal firm organization, for example, Davis et al. (1996) , Lorenz and Valeyre (2004) and Bartelsman and Doms (2000) . In the Appendix, we present a synthesis of the chosen initial values and the possible combinations defined for some relevant parameters.
The simulation model consists of an industry composed by 10 firms. The industry is characterized by its "institutional setting", α t , which is an exogenous variable, only partially observable by the firms. For simulation purposes, we consider that α, while approximated by the relative importance of routine and non-routine workers in the employment structure behind the industry, is equal to 0.5. 18 Since we do not introduce the determinants of the labour supply in our model, α is kept constant, as it corresponds to structural, institutional characteristics that are remarkably stable over time. In fact, the characteristics associated with skills and education employment structures are likely to present a high degree of inertia (see Baron et al. 1996) . Therefore, the model considers that firms are able to change their "institutional settings", but maintain the global, exogenous "institutional setting" stable.
In period t = 0 we have each firm's mix of workers, α i0 and profits, π i0 . We construct the initial configuration according to the chosen parameters and scenarios. In addition, the initial values of each firm's institutional setting, α i0 , were drawn from a uniform distribution in the ]0, 1[ interval. We also set initial values for the distinct types of workers and the technology of each firm (see the "Appendix") to implement the model.
The simulation exercise has two main sets: one that considers equal technological progress for all firms (EqualTP), and another that assumes idiosyncratic technological behaviours (FirmSpecificTP). 19 Moreover, the study considers two stages: one that assumes a completely stable exogenous environment, and another that considers two distinct exogenous demand shocks after a certain number of time runs (a reduction and an increase of around 30%).
In each simulation exercise, a total of 250 time periods (T = 250) is considered. Several experiments were performed in order to validate the model and ascertain its robustness. For considerations on the processes and techniques associated to the validation and verification of simulation models, see for example Sargent (1999) . More specifically, the following experiments were conducted.
On the one hand, we ran the model using 10 different seeds for the random number generator. Also, we considered alternative values (both lower and higher) for six of the key elements in the model, namely the initial workers' satisficing wages w s R j0 and w s N R j0 , the bargaining powers β and γ , the desired filled vacancies ratios ρ R i and ρ N R i , the exogenous rate of technological progress g, the number of periods with accumulated negative or nil profits until firms exit the market and the production function elasticities β 1 and β 2 . Finally, alternative sizes (both lower and higher) for the two types of demand shock were also considered.
A thorough analysis of the results provided by these experiments showed that the model is indeed rather robust. On the one hand, the results obtained with each of the 10 different seeds were quite similar (and therefore all the variables behaved in the same way).
Footnote 18 continued European countries, as a way to achieve greater flexibility and cooperation at the workplace. They conclude that two types of organizational forms, the "Learning Model" and the "Lean Model", which correspond to organizational forms where variables measuring autonomy, task complexity, learning and problem-solving are over-represented, account for respectively 39 and 28% of the employees. At the same time, the two other classes of the proposed typology, the "Taylorist Model" and the "Traditional Model", both associated with minimal learning dynamics, low complexity and low autonomy, account for, respectively, 14 and 19% of the employees. Since the study is applied to the economy as a whole, and our model only concerns manufacturing, the value of 50% associated to non-routine sets of tasks seems a reasonable feature for the exogenous industrial environment. 19 The consideration of these two sets is supported by the literature on firms' dynamic capabilities Teece et al. 1997 and industry technological trajectories (Pavitt 1984) .
On the other hand, changing the values of the six key elements, as well as the size of the demand shocks, did not change the behaviour of the various variables or their relative positions, with only one exception noted below, though their specific values can necessarily change in some cases. This essentially means that the effects and conclusions described in the next sections would remain unchanged had other configurations been used. As an example, the values of several variables can be somewhat lower or higher when the demand shock is more or less intense. However, regardless of the size of the demand shock, the variables exhibit the same behaviour (i.e. increase or decrease) and the same relative position (i.e. one wage higher or lower than another wage). The same is valid for the six key elements.
The only exception concerns one experiment with the initial workers' satisficing wages, in which the original evolution for one variable, the contractual wage for the non-routine workers, was not achieved, though all the remaining variables evolved as in the original scenario. Thus, the model is indeed quite robust, since its conclusions remain valid when different values are used for the random number generator seed, the key elements and the size of the demand shocks.
Statistical tests were not performed, since the thorough analysis of the sensitivity tests deemed them unnecessary. Indeed, the statistical tests would not be testing for closeness or equality of the values of the various variables since, as previously mentioned, those values can or must be higher or lower as the key element/demand shock varies. Rather, the tests would have to check whether the behaviour of the variables, and their relative positions, was the same. A thorough analysis of tables and charts with the values of the various variables showed us that this always happened, with the single exception noted above, so any statistical test could only lead to the same conclusion.
We remark that a 30% increase or reduction in demand might seem excessive. However, this is not a change in a country's aggregate demand, but only in the demand of a certain industry. As such, this percentage is not unreasonable. Indeed, higher values can occur in various conditions. Some examples are: the appearance of a more sophisticated substitute product or a price cut/increase in an existing substitute product; particularly good or adverse season conditions in the case of seasonal products; cancellation or postponement of public investment in infrastructures due to restrictive fiscal policies such as those recently adopted in the Euro Zone due to the need for public financial consolidation. Nonetheless, and as mentioned above, our results are robust in the size of the demand shock, and remain valid for smaller or larger shocks.
Results

Stable exogenous environment
In the stable environment configuration, in both the EqualTP and the FirmSpecificTP sets, the industry observes an initial strong shake-out period, with most firms leaving after 10 time steps (see Table 1 ). As a consequence, there is a clear improvement in the average fitness of the population of incumbent firms. Afterwards, the entry and exit of firms leads to a slow but regular improvement of that variable in the EqualTP set, and to a more irregular path in the FirmSpecificTP set. The first set has two initial surviving firms at T = 50, firm 1 (α i0 = 0.404) and firm 5 (α i0 = 0.512), whereas the second set has only one, firm 7 (α i0 = 0.659). This result is not surprising, since in the FirmSpecificTP set the technological progress rate depends not only on each firm's "institutional fitness", but also on each firm's relative weight of non-routine workers. When compared with firms 1 and 5, firm 7 has a lower initial fit, but benefits from a higher relative number of non-routine workers. The EqualTP scenario shows less turbulence, and has a less concentrated market structure, with the inverse Herfindhal index showing an almost minimal concentration (see Table 1 ). In addition, the turnover of firms, 20 after the initial shake out, is higher for the FirmSpecificTP set. This is also not surprising, since in the EqualTP set the firms have the same technological path, whereas in the FirmSpecificTP set the firms have distinct technological efficiencies. Figures 3 and 4 , which give the number of entries in each period, clearly show that the FirmSpecificTP set is more unstable. The peak in period 5 provides additional evidence of the initial shake-out.
In terms of the co-evolution of the population of firms and the population of workers, both sets show that the introduction of matching and bargaining processes in the labour market results in important frictions, as shown by the existence of ex-post vacancies and unemployment. The EqualTP set is featured by a higher creation of job vacancies and by a lower ability of the firms to fill them (in Fig. 5 , we present the evolution of the total vacancies in both sets). As a result, since in our model [cf. Eqs. (15) and (16)] the wages offered by the firms depend on the ability to fill the ex-ante vacancies (the firm only increases the wage in the next period if it did not attain the desired ratio of vacancies in the last period), the wages for both types of workers increase more in the EqualTP set than in the FirmSpecificTP set. This is clearly shown in Figs. 6 and 7, which give the evolution of the wages for non-routine and routine workers, respectively.
In both sets, the average wage of non-routine workers increases over time, whereas the average wage of the routine workers decreases in the FirmSpecific set and, after We have not tried to match our typology of workers with empirical data. If we roughly match non-routine workers with skilled labour and routine workers with unskilled labour, the similarity between our computational results and empirical data is interesting to note, despite the assumption of neutral/non-occupationally biased technological change. Indeed, several studies have found evidence of an increase in wage-income inequality over the last two decades in several advanced and developing countries (for example, Borjas and Ramey 1994; Freeman 1995; Richardson 1995; Gottschalk 1997; Jensen and Troske 1997; Johnson 1997; Wood 1998; Katz and Autor 1999; Jolivet et al. 2006; Antonioli et al. 2011; Oesch and Menés 2011; Weiss and Garloff 2011) . In Fig. 8 , we can see that our artificial economy does indeed lead to increasing inequality between both types of workers. This evolution must be understood within an industry where the non-routine workers are more productive per unit of output than routine workers, and where the firms have less negotiable power when bargaining with non-routine workers. 21 Since the FirmSpecificTP set is more turbulent and firms create fewer vacancies for both types of workers, the unemployment rates are higher in this set (Fig. 9) . In both configurations, the initial shake-out leads to a peak in the unemployment rates. As expected, unemployment has a similar influence on both types of workers, since the respective population is exogenous and constant, technological change is neutral and wages are higher for the more productive workers. Table 2 presents the average final period results for each configuration. The numbers in parentheses correspond to the variances. Note that the average wages paid to both types of workers, as well as the relative wage, are higher in the EqualTP configuration. This occurs because the average rates of filling the vacancies (denoted as Avg_r_NR and Avg_r_R for non-routine and routine workers, respectively) are higher in the FirmSpecificTP set and, thus, according to our formal model, firms do not need to increase wages as often in this configuration. The higher instability of the FirmSpecificTP set is associated with higher unemployment rates for both workers. In terms of the firms' "institutional gap", in both sets the average fitness of the incumbent firms is substantially improved with the industry initial shake out. The average fitness then evolves around a long-run equilibrium threshold that may be called an evolutionary stationary state. By evolutionary we mean that history matters, as the path trajectory of the variable shows, since it reveals reversions and path dependency. Figure 10 presents the time trajectories of the average fitness in each configuration set. In addition, Table 2 shows that, for T = 250, the average fitness is quite good (0.076 for the EqualTP set and 0.085 for the FirmSpecificTP Model, with low variances).
Demand shocks
Using the configuration that seems closer to economic reality, the FirmSpecificTP Model, we induce exogenous demand shocks and study their impact on the The impact is rather surprising in terms of job posts and wage evolution when compared with a standard neoclassical labour demand model. In fact, the existence of matching and bargaining processes means that the response of firms to a variation in demand is not automatically absorbed in terms of job places and wages, as is the case in standard neoclassical models. Important differences associated with these shocks are also visible in the market structure, since they lead to an important process of exits and entries in the industry, and to a change in the concentration index. The adjustment in terms of "institutional gap" is similar before and after the shock. To understand this result, it is important to recall that the number of firms in the population is assumed as constant and that, although some randomness does exist, the entrant firms have features close to the average characteristics of the surviving firms.
Reduction in the demand An exogenous reduction in demand leads to a small improvement in the "institutional fitness" of the incumbent firms in comparison with the behaviour of the economy without shocks (see Fig. 11 ).
This improvement in the institutional fit may be associated with a strong selection process that eliminates the less fit firms in a more restrictive environment. The turbulence in the industry increases strongly after the demand shock, as Fig. 12 shows. Without the shock, the industry registers a turnover of firms around 0.4 for T = 250. For the overall 250 time period, with the shock, this value increases to 0.96, whereas when restricting the analysis only to the post-shock period (after T = 125) the turnover is 1.55. For a constant population of 10 firms, these values mean a significant increase in the industry's turbulence. As the literature mentions (for example, Christensen and Rosenbloom 1995) , changes in demand represent a major variation in the environment in which firms operate, and may favour the entry of new firms rather than the success of established ones.
As expected, the reduction in demand induces a decrease in the number of vacancies (Fig. 13) . Consequently, the unemployment rates substantially increase (Fig. 14) . This increase in unemployment is accompanied by an increase in wages for both types of workers. This happens because the ability of the firms to fill their vacancies decreases after the shock. Therefore, since the range of firms that do not satisfy the desired ratio of filled vacancies increases (see Fig. 15 ), the firms increase their wages. Consequently, we observe a small increase in wages, although the economy suffers a negative shock, as Fig. 16 shows. This an emergent result, associated with the presence of frictions in the labour market, such as higher unemployment, ex-post vacancies and rising wages. Table 3 presents an overview of the results obtained with the average of the most relevant variables. The numbers in parentheses represent the variances. Note that the averages for the set with the demand shock correspond to the entire period, and not only to the post-shock period. Therefore, the results appear smoother. For example, the average total unemployment rate for the period after the shock is 6.8%, whereas the value observed for the entire period is 4.9%. This rate of 6.8% results from unemployment rates of 6.95 and 6.7% for routine and non-routine workers, respectively.
Increase in the demand
We also consider the impact of an increase in demand. Figure 17 gives the evolution of the average fitness of the incumbent firms. This average fitness deteriorates slightly after the shock. It seems that the increase in demand allows less fit firms, that would otherwise leave the industry, to survive longer. The turbulence in the market is smaller than in the configuration without shocks, as shown by the number of entries (Fig. 18) . In fact, the turnover of firms decreases substantially after the shock: the average turnover is 0.4 for the entire period without shocks, and only 0.29 for the entire period considering the shock (0.21 for the period after the shock only).
In terms of labour market dynamics, the number of vacancies is slightly higher after the shock (see Fig. 19 ). Therefore, the unemployment rates are somewhat lower than in the model with no shock, as shown in Fig. 20 .
The increase in demand does not lead to an increase in wages. In fact, in our economy the adjustment of the labour demand is not automatic. Firms interact with workers through matching and bargaining processes where the bargaining power is split between the actors. Our simulation results show that, after the shock, non-routine and routine wages have a relatively stable behaviour (Fig. 21) . SumContWages (0) NR_W_ID (P)
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F_Cont_Wage_R (1) Exit (0) F_TotalVac (1) Entry (0) F_Vac_NR (0) InvHerf (0) A_Fit_Coeff (P) A_LNR_value * In parentheses we have the letter "P" when the respective label corresponds to a parameter in the model. Alternatively, the labels that correspond to variables have in parentheses an integer that denotes the lagged time associated with each of them The relative wage continues to increase after the shock, although at a slower pace, as seen in Fig. 22 . This can also be seen in Table 4 , which presents the average final period simulation results. To understand the behaviour of the wages, we must consider the ability of the firms to fill their vacancies. In order to do that, we must analyze the effective ratios of filled vacancies (r _NR and r _R), for the configurations with and without shocks.
In Table 4 , we can see that these two variables are somewhat improved when compared with the situation without shocks. This means that, on average, firms fill a larger proportion of their vacancies, so there are fewer ex-post vacancies. According to our model, this means that firms do not have to increase their wages in order to attract workers to their queues. Nevertheless, the wages of non-routine workers increase more than in the set without shocks, whereas wages for routine workers have a very similar behaviour in both sets (see Table 4 ).
In a period of expansion, the firms' efforts to fulfil rising demand mean they will pay relatively more to non-routine workers, who not only are more productive, but also have a greater bargaining power. The average wage for non-routine workers is 0.346 after the demand increase, and only 0.314 and 0.339 for the model with no shock, and the entire period in the model with a demand shock, respectively. For routine workers, the average wage is 0.111 for all these three cases. The relative wage is higher for the post-shock period (3.17), than for the entire period both with and without shocks (3.069 and 3.065, respectively).
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an evolutionary model where heterogeneous firms and workers interact and co-evolve, which accounts for some key features of the job search, bargaining and matching literature. Within a micro-meso perspective, the model highlights the influence of firms' "institutional settings" on industry dynamics. These settings are formalized as the firms' labour choices.
The results obtained by means of computer simulation robustly show that, in a stable environment, there is a clear initial improvement in the average fitness of the incumbent firms' population, which then evolves around an evolutionary stationary threshold. The introduction of endogenous matching and bargaining processes in the labour market leads to important frictions, as shown by the existence of ex-post vacancies and unemployment. Furthermore, there is increasing wage inequality between the two types of workers considered in the model. It is important to stress that this outcome occurs in a scenario where technological progress is neutral. Therefore, wage inequality does not derive exclusively from biased technological change as most of the WagesNR literature in this specific research area sustains (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2001 ), but rather, it does to some extent depend on the firms' intrinsic institutional choices regarding labour. We also analyzed the effect of both positive and negative demand shocks. The turbulence in the industry increases (decreases) after a negative (positive) demand shock. As expected, the negative demand shock causes a decrease in the number of vacancies and, consequently, unemployment rates increase considerably. This rise in unemployment, quite surprisingly, goes together with an increase in wages for both types of workers, since the capability of firms to fill their vacancies decreases after the shock. This latter aspect is an emergent property of the model as it results from the interaction of firms and workers and not from a previously imposed assumption, and mimics quite well the recent experience of some economies, namely, the US, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. After the positive demand shock, firms increase their number of vacancies slightly, so the unemployment rates are lower than in the model without shocks.
We should bear in mind that these results were obtained for a specific model, within a computational simulation setting. Therefore, it is important to highlight the limitations of this approach, and caution should be used in interpreting the results. In what concerns the theoretical frame, we could explore more realistic assumptions, namely regarding the duration of jobs and the wage setting mechanism itself. Moreover, we could endogenize the supply of both types of labour in the model, which would allow us to examine issues related to education, training and employment policies. The exploration of 'occupationally'-biased technological change could also be a interesting topic for future research.
